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THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN 
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ v. BEATY 
JENNIFER PRICE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Republic of Iraq v. Beaty,1 the Supreme Court is asked to 
determine whether a Presidential waiver has restored Iraqi sovereign 
immunity that had been previously removed by the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). In deciding the case, the 
Court must address two questions: first, did the Emergency Wartime 
Supplemental Appropriations Act (EWSAA) grant the President 
authority to waive 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) and, second, did either the 
EWSAA or the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), by 
explicitly granting the authority to restore Iraq’s sovereign immunity, 
apply to pending cases? In answering these questions, the Court must 
also elucidate its approach to statutory interpretation, particularly the 
level of deference given to Congressional intent as discerned via 
legislative history and Executive interpretations. 
II.  FACTS 
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA),2 revising part of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act (FSIA) by revoking the sovereign immunity of states in 
suits for monetary damages based on allegations of state-sponsored 
terrorism.3 Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), the AEDPA provided 
that a U.S. national could sue an agent of a foreign state for personal 
 
 *  2010 J.D./L.L.M. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Republic of Iraq v. Simon, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert granted, 129 S. Ct. 894 
(mem.) (U.S. Jan. 9, 2009) (Nos. 08-539 and 07 -1090) (consolidating the case with Republic of 
Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 893 (mem.)). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1242–43 (1996). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000) (repealed). 
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injury from terrorism-related crimes if the state had been designated 
as a sponsor of terrorism at the time of the alleged acts.4 
Shortly after the passage of the AEDPA, and following the first 
Gulf War, Kevin Beaty, William Barloon, their wives and other 
detainees sued Iraq under § 1605(a)(7) because they had been taken 
hostage and tortured by the Saddam Hussein regime.5 After the 
plaintiffs won their suit, in early 2003, Beaty’s and Barloon’s children 
also filed suit against Iraq for the emotional damage they suffered 
during their fathers’ captivity.6 That same year, in a different suit, 
Robert Simon filed similar claims against Iraq for having been taken 
hostage and tortured during the Gulf War.7 
In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and Congress 
passed the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act 
(EWSAA).8 A few months later the President declared the § 
1605(a)(7) exception to sovereign immunity inapplicable to Iraq per 
Section 1503 of the EWSAA,9 enacted during the Gulf War, which 
had permitted suspension of certain sanctionor terrorism-related 
provisions for Iraq.10 In 2008,11 Congress passed the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), of which Section 
1083(a) repealed the § 1605(a)(7) exception and replaced it with a 
new exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A expanding individuals’ ability to 
recover against states that sponsor terrorism.12 In order to protect the 
Iraqi reconstruction effort, however, Congress added Section 1083(d) 
to the NDAA,13 which permitted the President to waive the other 
 
 4. Id. These offenses included torture and hostage taking if the foreign official was acting 
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency. The plaintiff must have also given 
the state a chance to first arbitrate the claim. Id. 
 5. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 20–24 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 6. Beaty v. Republic of Iraq, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 7. Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 108-11, at 1, 117 Stat. 559, 559 (2003). 
 9. Pres. Determ. No. 2003-23, 68 Fed. Reg. 26459 (May 7, 2003). 
 10. Id. (“The President may suspend the application of any provision of the Iraq Sanctions 
Act of 1990 . . . Provided further, That the President may make inapplicable with respect to Iraq 
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law that applies to 
countries that have supported terrorism . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 11. After the circuit court decision in Beaty v. Iraq but before the appellate arguments for 
Simon v. Iraq. 
 12. Pub. L. No. 110-181, Section 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338–45 (2008). The NDAA established a 
federal cause of action allowing punitive damages and replacing § 1605(a)(7) with a new § 
1605A. Section 1083(c)(1) stated that regarding application to pending cases, “The amendments 
made by this section shall apply to any claim arising under section 1605A.” 
 13. Id. 
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provisions within Section 1083 with respect to Iraq, including the new 
§ 1605A exception to sovereign immunity.14 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Prior to the litigation in the cases consolidated before the Court in 
Iraq v. Beaty, the courts had developed a general jurisprudence on 
how to interpret the retroactive application of various statutes. In 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products15 the Supreme Court held that when a 
statute affects not simply jurisdiction but also substantive rights, 
including a statute that “impairs rights a party possessed when he 
acted,” it cannot be read retroactively absent clear Congressional 
intent.16 Therefore, when Congress has not plainly defined the scope 
of the provision with respect to pending cases the courts must 
determine whether it affects only jurisdiction or substantive rights as 
well.17 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,18 however, the Supreme Court held that 
retroactivity is usually not an issue for statutes that merely confer or 
remove jurisdiction because jurisdictional statutes “[take] away no 
substantive right but simply [change] the tribunal that is to hear the 
case.”19 Therefore, jurisdictional statutes, said the Court, presumably 
apply to pending cases.20 But despite this presumption, the Court 
relied on the “normal rules of construction, including a contextual 
reading of the statutory language”21 and preceding legislative history.22 
Where other provisions in the same section of the statute contained 
explicit language evidencing Congress’s intent that the statute apply 
to cases pending before the statute’s enactment, the Court found the 
 
 14. Pres. Determ. No. 2008-9, 73 Fed. Reg. 6571 (Jan. 28, 2008). 
 15. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 16. See id. at 280 (holding the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not apply to conduct prior to its 
enactment). 
 17. See id. (“When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court 
must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would 
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or 
impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate 
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear 
congressional intent favoring such a result.”). 
 18. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Justice Roberts did not participate in this 
decision. 
 19. Id. at 576–77. 
 20. Id. at 577. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at n.10, 580, 584. 
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lack of such language in the jurisdiction-stripping provision 
demonstrated Congress’s intent that it not apply to pending cases.23 
The Court has previously examined the retroactive application of 
the FSIA in Republic of Austria v. Altmann,24 where it held that the 
presumption against applying statutes retroactively was merely “a 
presumption, rather than a constitutional command.”25 Though there 
was no clear Congressional language, the Landgraf analysis proved 
unsatisfactory to the Court because the FSIA “defies . . . 
categorization” as to whether it affects only jurisdiction or substantive 
rights.26 Specifically, the Court noted that prior cases had stated that 
the FSIA was a statute that codified foreign sovereign immunity rules 
“‘as an aspect of substantive federal law.’”27 The Court went on to 
determine that foreign immunity questions “reflect[] current political 
realities and relationships” and found it appropriate to follow history 
“by deferring to the ‘decisions of the political branches . . . on whether 
to take jurisdiction.’”28 Noting that one of Congress’s stated purposes 
was “eliminating political participation in the resolution of such 
claims,”29 the Court found that Congress intended to apply the statute 
to conduct occurring before its enactment.30 The Court’s holding 
followed Justice Scalia’s approach in his Landgraf concurrence, and 
did not focus on the distinction between jurisdiction and the 
impairment of rights but rather on what the “relevant activity that the 
rule regulates” was.31 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Altman, the D.C. Circuit 
decided Acree v. Republic of Iraq,32 holding that the EWSAA (of 
which Section 1503 had permitted suspension of certain sanctionor 
terrorism-related provisions for Iraq) did not authorize the President 
 
 23. See id. at 582–84 (deciding that the courts continued to have jurisdiction over pending 
habeas cases). 
 24. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). 
 25. Id. at 692–93. 
 26. Id. at 694. 
 27. Id. at 695 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496–97 
(1983) (emphasis added)). 
 28. Id. at 696. 
 29. Id. at 679. 
 30. Id. at 697. 
 31. Id. at 698. 
 32. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
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to suspend the former § 1605(a)(7) with regard to Iraq.33 Reading 
Section 1503 of the EWSAA as a whole and in the context of the 
entire statute, the court held it did not encompass § 1605(a)(7) 
because Section 1503 was “aimed at legal provisions that present 
obstacles to assistance and funding for the new Iraqi Government and 
was not intended to alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts under 
the FSIA.”34 Notably, in terms of predicting the outcome of the 
current case before the Supreme Court, current Chief Justice Roberts, 
a D.C. Circuit Judge at the time, disagreed with the majority’s holding, 
finding instead that Presidential Determination 2003-23 “ousted the 
federal courts of jurisdiction in cases that relied on that exception to 
Iraq’s sovereign immunity.”35 Then-Judge Roberts’s interpretation was 
rooted in his interpretation that “‘[a]ny other provision’ should be 
read to mean ‘any other provision,’ not, as the majority would have it, 
‘provisions that present obstacles to assistance and funding for the 
new Iraqi Government.’”36 He emphasized his view that the EWSAA 
represented “the first time [Congress] confronted the prospect that a 
friendly successor government would, in its infancy, be vulnerable 
under Section 1605(a)(7) to crushing liability for the actions of its 
renounced predecessor.”37 Roberts also found that the recent 
Ciccipio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran38 decision had determined 
that § 1605(a)(7) was merely a jurisdictional provision affecting no 
substantive rights and thus was “not impermissibly retroactive with 
respect to pending cases.”39 
IV.  HOLDING 
In Beaty v. Iraq40 the D.C. District Court, though considering the 
question prior to the enactment of the NDAA and the subsequent 
presidential waiver of Section 1083, ruled that Iraqi sovereignty had 
 
 33. Id. at 48 (dismissing the case because under Ciccipio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
370 F. 3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the claimants needed to state a cause of action under a specific 
source of law, such as a state tort law claim). 
 34. Id. at 51. 
 35. Id. at 60 (Roberts, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 61. 
 38. Ciccipio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that 
§ 1605(a)(7) creates no private right of action against the state, therefore requiring plaintiffs to 
file claims under a source of law other than § 1605(a)(7)). 
 39. Acree, 370 F.3d at 65. 
 40. Beaty v. Iraq, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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not been restored by a Presidential waiver under the EWSAA.41 The 
court held that whether the plaintiffs had stated an actionable claim 
of relief under § 1605(a)(7) was answered by Ciccipio-Puleo v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran,42 and the plaintiffs re-filed their complaint under 
various state tort law claims.43 The court then looked to the language 
of § 1605(a)(7) and found the plaintiffs met all the requirements for 
jurisdiction under that provision.44 
The district court then had to decide whether—even if the case 
was nonjusticiable as preempted by the President’s restoration of 
sovereign immunity, as a political question, or as contravening the 
foreign-affairs preemption or act-of-state doctrines45—the court 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.46 Before the court could address 
the impact of the first Presidential Determination, Determination 
2003-23, on the court’s jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Acree v. 
Republic of Iraq47 that the EWSAA did not give the President 
authority to waive § 1605(a)(7) for Iraq.48 The district court, forced to 
uphold Acree, lamented that were it free to reach the question itself, it 
would instead follow Judge Roberts’s persuasive argument that the 
plain language of the statute did indeed grant presidential authority 
to waive § 1605(a)(7).49 
In determining whether the case presented a political question, 
the Court would not permit an end-run around Acree50 and therefore 
dismissed Iraq’s justiciability challenge and other subject matter 
jurisdiction challenges.51 In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the 
D.C. Circuit upheld the decision, saying only that Iraq’s sovereign 
 
 41. Id. at 70 (rejecting Iraq’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, that federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, and that the claims 
were nonjusticiable or preempted because of their potential to undermine foreign policy). 
 42. See Ciccipio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1032 (stating that the FSIA created no private right of 
action). 
 43. Beaty, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 93–99 (finding the state law-based intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim valid). 
 44. Id. at 69. 
 45. Id. at 70–90. 
 46. Id. at 69. 
 47. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 48. Id. at 48. 
 49. Beaty, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 70. 
 50. Id. at 76. 
 51. Id. at 70–90 (dismissing some claims for which the court lacked jurisdiction due to the 
President’s waiver for Iraq and dismissing other claims under political question, foreign-affairs 
preemption, and act-of-state doctrines). 
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immunity “has not been restored under the Emergency Wartime 
Supplemental appropriations Act” as held in Acree.52 
Despite the addition of the NDAA (which expanded the 
sovereign immunity exception but explicitly granted Executive power 
to exempt Iraq from the new exception) and the President’s 
subsequent waiver of the NDAA’s applicability to Iraq, the D.C. 
courts continued to find the case justiciable. The D.C. Circuit in Simon 
v. Iraq53 addressed whether the NDAA repealed § 1605(a)(7), 
removing jurisdiction over Simon’s tort claim, while the presidential 
waiver under Section 1083 prevented re-filing under the new § 
1605A.54 
In analyzing whether the courts retained jurisdiction over the § 
1605(a)(7) cases, the D.C. Circuit Court observed the line drawn in 
Hamdan and Landgraf between statutes that affect only jurisdiction 
and thus are presumed to apply to pending cases, and statutes that 
alter substantive rights and thus cannot be applied retroactively 
absent clear Congressional intent.55 Rather than determining whether 
substantive rights were implicated by the NDAA, the Court instead 
found that the language of Section 1083 and the “text and structure of 
the NDAA” provided enough guidance for their interpretation.56 The 
NDAA’s reference to cases “filed under this section”57 literally meant 
those filed under § 1605A, and not the pre-amendment § 1605(a)(7); 
likewise the amendment’s application to claims “arising under section 
1605A” did not apply to pending claims.58 Additionally, the fact that 
the NDAA granted plaintiffs sixty-days—following either the 
enactment of the NDAA or the entry of judgment, during which time 
their § 1605(a)(7) cases could be re-filed under § 1605A—meant 
courts still had jurisdiction to enter judgment on pending cases after 
the NDAA’s enactment.59 Furthermore, Acree had already held that 
the earlier EWSAA did not authorize the President to suspend § 
 
 52. Beaty v. Republic of Iraq, No. 70-7057, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27256 at *1 (D.C. Cir. 
Nov. 21, 2007). 
 53. Simon v. Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 54. Id. at 1190. 
 55. Id. at 1189–91 (overturning the district court’s ruling that the suit was untimely and 
refusing to find a non-justiciable question). 
 56. Id. at 1191. 
 57. Pub. L. No. 110-81, Section 1083(c)(1) (“The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to any claim arising under section 1605A [of this statute] . . . .”). 
 58. Simon, 529 F.3d at 1191–92. 
 59. Id. at 1192–93. 
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1605(a)(7) for Iraq.60 Combined with the provisions surrounding 
Section 1083, the Court found Section 1083(d)(1) merely granted the 
President the power to render inapplicable to Iraq those parts of the 
NDAA to which he had objected in the bill’s first codification, and 
that the NDAA applies only to suits under § 1605A.61 
V.  ANALYSIS 
At the heart of Iraq v. Beaty is a relatively straight-forward 
question of statutory construction: whether either the EWSAA or the 
NDAA allow the President to render § 1605(a)(7) inapplicable to 
Iraq. The Court’s decision, however, could add fuel to either side of 
the enduring debate regarding the deference courts give to 
Congressional intent and Executive foreign policy determinations. 
If the Court upholds Acree v. Republic of Iraq and the lower 
courts’ interpretations of the EWSAA and NDAA, then subsequent 
courts may find themselves with more leeway to interpret statutes and 
Executive determinations in ways which may seem contrary to their 
texts. If the Court instead finds that the D.C. Circuit has 
misinterpreted the statutes, it would direct the judiciary to give more 
deference to the text of foreign-policy-related laws and their 
interpretation by the President. 
A. Arguments 
Beaty, Simon, and the other respondents highlight the reasoning 
of the Acree court and the decisions of the D.C. courts below—
collectively holding that neither the EWSAA nor the NDAA granted 
the President the authority to restore Iraqi sovereign immunity—to 
argue that the text of the EWSAA is ambiguous while that of the 
NDAA is not, that Congress did not intend to allow the removal of 
jurisdiction initially under the EWSAA and intended to do so only 
prospectively under the NDAA, and that there is no real danger of 
harming U.S. foreign policy by deciding existing suits. 
The text of Section 1503 of the EWSAA must be looked at, 
according to Respondents and the Acree court, in light of its context 
 
 60. Id. at 1193. 
 61. Id. at 1194. 
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and the other provisions around it.62 In the EWSAA the reference to 
the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 “indicates that the section is concerned 
with eliminating statutory restrictions on aid and exports needed for 
Iraq’s reconstruction, and not with principles of sovereign immunity 
or the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.”63 Thus, the Respondents assert that 
the provision sought to remove funding obstacles for reconstruction, 
and the term “any provision” should be read in light of that purpose—
a purpose that does not encompass jurisdiction.64 The EWSAA’s 
context also includes Congress’s intent as demonstrated in Section 
1083(c)(4) of the NDAA: “Nothing in section 1503 of the Emergency 
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act . . . has ever authorized, 
directly or indirectly . . . the removal of the jurisdiction of any court of 
the United States.”65 In keeping with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
Respondents also argue that Section 1083 removes jurisdiction 
without providing any alternative forum for the suits against Iraq, and 
thus, should not be applied to pending cases without express statutory 
language to that effect.66 The absence of such language evidences 
Congress’s intent that the statute apply only to prospective cases. As 
for the damage to reconstruction efforts and the financial stability of 
Iraq, alleged by Petitioners to be important foreign policy goals of the 
United States, Respondents point out that Section 1083 has no 
adverse effect. Respondents argue “[b]luntly: no more claims will ever 
be filed against Iraq for the torturing of U.S. soldiers and citizens” and 
those cases can be settled for nothing of material significance to 
Iraq.67 
Petitioners urge the Court to overturn Acree and reverse the 
lower courts’ decisions, arguing that the relevant text of the EWSAA 
and the NDAA is unambiguous and should be interpreted as such—
that in the realm of foreign affairs the President’s inherent authority 
 
 62. Brief in Opposition at 26–27, Republic of Iraq v. Simon, No. 08-539 (U.S. Nov. 24, 
2008). 
 63. Id. at 27. 
 64. Id. at 27–29. 
 65. Brief In Opposition at 9–11, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, No. 70-1090 (U.S. Apr. 23, 
2008). 
 66. Id. at 17–19. 
 67. Id. at 7; see also id. at 10–12 (observing that when the President waived § 1605A for 
Iraq as of January 2008, only six or seven cases existed, (including Simon, another case joined 
with Simon on appeal and Acree) with likely damages of approximately $1 billion, which is a 
financial burden Iraq is able to bear with its “projected . . . budget surplus of nearly $80 
billion”). 
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should be given deference and that to allow pending suits to proceed 
will damage U.S. foreign policy with regard to Iraq. 
According to Iraq, the text of EWSAA Section 1503 should be 
interpreted broadly. Echoing the words of then-Judge Roberts’s 
concurrence in Acree, Petitioners argue that the President’s authority 
to waive “any provision” with respect to Iraq be given its plain, broad 
meaning—”any” means “any”—to include § 1605(a)(7).68 This 
interpretation is consistent with prior decisions giving “any” a broad 
reading in the absence of contrary legislative history.69 Thus, unlike the 
Acree court’s interpretation of the statute, Petitioners argue that there 
is no evidence of legislative intent to limit the provision to purely 
financial obstacles for assisting Iraq. The provision’s terms are not 
restricted by reference to money but rather by the fact that any laws 
the President determines shall no longer apply to Iraq must “‘appl[y] 
to countries that have supported terrorism.’ That perfectly describes 
former Section 1605(a)(7).”70 Even using the potential motive of 
lifting financial burdens, the United States argues that for Iraq, 
“Section 1605(a)(7) is a statute that, to use the words of the Acree 
majority, ‘present[s] obstacles to funding for the new Iraqi 
Government’” because of the potential costs of liability.71 Moreover, 
subsequent legislative history cannot be used to interpret a prior act 
of Congress, meaning that Section 1083(c)(4) of the NDAA has no 
bearing on the effect of the EWSAA.72 
Petitioners also argue that Section 1083 of the NDAA should be 
read to apply to pending cases. According to their argument, this 
section strips jurisdiction, not substantive rights, and thus applies to 
pending cases; to say that plaintiffs were left with no alternative 
forum incorrectly confuses “Congress’s action in repealing and 
replacing former Section 1605(a)(7)” (the new § 1605A encompassing 
every case cognizable under the original), “with the President’s action 
 
 68. Brief for Petitioners at 23, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, Nos. 07-1090 & 08-539 (U.S. Feb. 
19, 2009) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief]. 
 69. Id. at 23–24 (citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2008) and 
Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980)). 
 70. Id. at 25. 
 71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Iraq v. Beaty, Nos. 07-1090 & 08-
539 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2008) (recommending the Court grant certiorari) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for 
the United States]. 
 72. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 68, at 35; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5–6, Republic of 
Iraq v. Beaty, No. 70-1090 (U.S. May 5, 2008). 
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in waiving [this] replacement.”73 Unlike the statutory provisions in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Petitioners argue this is not a case of several 
provisions explicitly applying to pending cases while the relevant 
provision makes no mention of such application.74 The provision’s text 
contains no explicit language contrary to “the usual rule that 
jurisdictional repealers apply to pending cases.”75 The Respondents’ 
claims are thus included in the President’s restoration of Iraqi 
sovereignty and are no longer justiciable. 
In addition to the statutes, Petitioners argue the President has 
inherent authority “to compromise the claims of U.S. nationals to 
further foreign policy interests.”76 Executive authority should be given 
broad deference regarding foreign policy because of the difficulty of 
anticipating the Executive’s foreign policy needs.77 Here both Section 
1503 of the EWSAA and Section 1083 of the NDAA were interpreted 
by the President, but the D.C. courts “erred in failing to accord any 
deference to his construction of that provision.”78 
B. Disposition 
To understand how the current Court is likely to resolve the 
question of whether Iraq’s immunity has been restored for cases 
pending when the EWSAA and NDAA were enacted, it is crucial to 
look at the three approaches taken in recent cases regarding 
retroactive application of statutes. 
Justice Scalia reiterated his famous disdain for referring to 
legislative history in Landgraf v. USI Film Products precisely because 
it “converts the ‘clear statement’ rule into a ‘discernible legislative 
intent’ rule,” and undermines the plain meaning of the text.79 When 
 
 73. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 10, Republic of Iraq v. Simon, No. 08-539 (U.S. Dec. 10, 
2008). 
 74. Id. at 11. 
 75. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 68, at 42. 
 76. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, No. 70-1090 (U.S. Feb. 
19, 2008). 
 77. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 68, at 30. 
 78. Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 71, at 15; see also Petitioner’s Brief, supra 
note 68, at 34, 52 (arguing that the failure to accord deference to the President’s interpretations 
and to allow the suits to continue directly jeopardizes U.S. foreign policy by financially 
burdening reconstruction and by risking similar suits against American forces in Iraq). 
 79. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 287 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (finding the statute non-retroactive because of the absence of a clear textual 
statement to indicate that it should be retroactive). 
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determining the retroactive application of a statute in the face of 
ambiguous text, he focuses on the nature of the activity covered by 
the statute, emphasizing the language of the statute as the foundation 
of this inquiry. If the statute deals with primary conduct, the term 
Scalia uses to refer to “substantive rights,” the presumption is against 
retroactive application. If the statute is merely procedural, i.e. 
jurisdictional, it is presumptively retroactive because the “plain 
import of a statute repealing jurisdiction is to eliminate” jurisdiction 
over pending cases too.80 In fact, “applying a jurisdiction-eliminating 
statute . . . to prevent any judicial action” after the statute’s enactment 
is not retroactive application at all, as it does not affect any 
substantive rights.81 
In joining Justice Scalia’s Hamdan dissent, Justice Alito appears to 
agree with Scalia’s overall approach. Though Justice Roberts has not 
participated in the Court’s prior cases dealing with the retroactive 
application of jurisdictional statutes,82 his dissent in Acree placed an 
emphasis on the plain meaning of the EWSAA’s text similar to 
Scalia’s approach, finding that because the EWSAA provision was 
merely jurisdictional it could be presumed to apply retroactively.83 
Though he joined Justice Scalia’s Landgraf concurrence, Justice 
Kennedy’s approach differs. Agreeing that the text is always the 
starting point for statutory interpretation, Justice Kennedy finds an 
even stronger presumption for non-retroactive application in the 
absence of a clear congressional statement. In addition to following 
the substantive rights/jurisdiction divide set out in Landgraf, Justice 
Kennedy distinguishes between provisions that confer jurisdiction and 
those that strip the courts of jurisdiction: the presumption against 
retroactivity still applies for the creation of jurisdiction and is only 
vanquished by jurisdiction-ousting statutes.84 For his Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann opinion this presumption proved dispositive 
 
 80. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 657–65 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the majority ignored the President’s interpreting the statute to apply to pending cases). 
 81. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 294; see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 703 
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the FSIA limits jurisdiction in U.S. courts only, and 
thus may affect substantive rights only incidentally by denying viable alternative forums). 
 82. Justice Roberts did not participate in the Hamdan, Landgraf or Altmann decisions. 
 83. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F. 3d. 41, 60–65 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 84. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 722–23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 
U.S. 320, 342–43, n.3 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting)). 
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because he found the FSIA to be ambiguous and therefore subject to 
the presumption against retroactivity.85 In determining whether the 
statute is clear regarding application to pending cases, Justice 
Kennedy takes issue with the implication in Altmann that deference 
be given to Executive statements despite their potential to undermine 
the intent of Congress.86 
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinions, in which Justice 
Ginsburg joined, for Hamdan, Landgraf, and Altmann. Like Justices 
Scalia and Kennedy, he began his statutory interpretation with the 
text. When the text proved unclear, however, Justice Stevens 
demonstrated a willingness to move beyond the provision’s text to its 
context and the nature of the rights at stake. Most importantly, he 
looked to the surrounding legislative history. In Justice Stevens’s 
analysis, a statute’s context appears to include related Executive 
commentary. So in Altmann he expressed concern with the political 
nature of the FSIA, noting that while the Court did not address the 
issue of the political question doctrine87 it nonetheless ought to defer 
to the political branches’ determinations regarding the wisdom of the 
courts taking jurisdiction in a case.88 Justice Stevens also relied on the 
accepted distinction between substantive statutes, which are 
presumed to be non-retroactive, and jurisdictional provisions, which 
are applicable to pending cases. 
Both the Acree v. Republic of Iraq and Simon v. Republic of Iraq 
decisions ostensibly rested on the language of the EWSAA and the 
NDAA, finding no need to determine whether the authority granted 
to the President removed substantive or jurisdictional rights. In its 
own interpretation, however, the court in Acree seemed to follow the 
approach of Justice Stevens in giving a contextual and purposive 
reading to what might otherwise be clear statutory language.89 Thus 
“any provision” came to mean any provision aimed at the purpose of 
eliminating financial obstacles.90 In contrast, the Simon decision made 
a Justice Scalia-like refusal to move beyond the pure text of the 
 
 85. Id. at 721–23. 
 86. Id. at 735–36. 
 87. Id. at 689. 
 88. Id. at 696. 
 89. See discussion supra Part III. 
 90. See Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J, concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing his interpretation of “any” to mean “any,” 
without the context added to the word by the majority). 
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NDAA, finding instead that the clear statutory language applied only 
prospectively to cases filed under § 1605A.91 
The real battle will likely be over whether the text of either the 
EWSAA or the NDAA is ambiguous. It seems that Justice Scalia will 
agree with Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation in Acree that the 
EWSAA is an unambiguously broad grant of power to the President. 
Despite Justice Stevens’s willingness to consider the statute’s purpose 
and legislative history, demonstrated in Acree, he has also been 
skeptical of questioning Executive interpretations of foreign affairs 
statutes and the FSIA specifically.92 Justice Stevens may very well 
decline to counter the President’s interpretation of the EWSAA’s 
scope. And Justice Kennedy has the opposite inclination, as he is 
skeptical of deferring to Executive statements, which may run counter 
to Congressional intent. 
The crucial holding will then be the application of either the 
EWSAA (if its clear language so authorized the President to waive 
the § 1605(a)(7) exception of sovereign immunity for Iraq) or the 
NDAA (if the EWSAA did not grant the President authority to waive 
§ 1605(a)(7) for Iraq) to pending cases. If the Court determines that 
the statutes have no clear statement on retroactivity, and must 
therefore determine whether the EWSAA and NDAA are 
jurisdictional or substantive, it appears the lower courts’ decisions will 
be overturned. Unlike the FSIA, which the Court has confusingly 
found to be both jurisdictional and substantive,93 a waiver for Iraq by 
the President under either Section 1503 of the EWSAA or Section 
1083(d) of the NDAA only removes the ability of a state or federal 
court to hear a case, and is therefore purely jurisdictional. Under the 
approaches of both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia, joined in their 
various opinions94 by the other justices, save Kennedy, if the statute is 
jurisdictional there is no presumption against retroactive application 
where, as here, there is no clear statement to the contrary. Even 
Justice Kennedy, with his greater wariness of retroactive application, 
 
 91. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 92. See id. at 689–96 (noting the importance of grace and commity in foreign affairs, and 
deferring to State Department policy, practice, and statements). 
 93. Id. at 695 (dealing with the FSIA as an act that created jurisdiction). 
 94. Again, looking at their opinions in Hamdan, Landgraf and Altmann. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/8/2009 12:27:32 PM 
2009] REPUBLIC OF IRAQ V. BEATY 457 
 
has said that statutes removing jurisdiction are not subject to the 
presumption against their application to pending cases.95 
The EWSAA provision does not have clear language addressing 
its application to cases pending when it was enacted, and thus if the 
Court holds that the President had authority to waive the exception 
for Iraq, it will probably find this to be a waiver of pure jurisdiction—
not involving substantive rights (Scalia’s “primary conduct”)—that 
applies retroactively. 
If the Court does not read the EWSAA to permit the Presidential 
waiver of § 1605(a)(7), it will then have to address the somewhat 
more difficult language of the NDAA with regard to retroactivity. The 
D.C. Circuit held in Simon that the language of Section 1083 was clear 
enough that its application to cases “arising under” and “filed under” 
its newly created provisions could be read literally to apply only to 
prospective claims filed after the NDAA’s enactment.96 The 
Petitioners argue that this language is not explicit enough to 
overcome the presumption for retroactive application for jurisdiction-
repealing statutes.97 
Yet this argument ignores the structure of the analysis undertaken 
in all three Justices’ approaches: competing presumptions of 
retroactivity and non-retroactivity do not come into play until after 
the text has been determined to be ambiguous. Legislative history and 
Executive interpretation are only considered if the text is ambiguous. 
In light of the deference given to a statute’s text by all Justices, and 
particularly Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, it seems likely 
that the Court will construe the NDAA’s language as demonstrating 
Congress’s intent that the President’s waiver for Iraq not apply to 
pending cases. Again, though, the determination of the EWSAA’s 
applicability will probably render this moot.98 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Court seems likely to hold that Section 1503 of the EWSAA 
provision authorized the President to waive the FSIA’s § 1605(a)(7) 
exception to sovereign immunity with regard to Iraq, and in so doing 
 
 95. Id. at 722–23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 96. Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1191–92 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 97. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 68, at 42. 
 98. See discussion supra Part V(B). 
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that Section 1503 rendered the cases pending at the time of the 
EWSAA’s enactment—including Acree v. Republic of Iraq, Beaty v. 
Republic of Iraq, and Simon v. Republic of Iraq—nonjusticiable. This 
ruling would combine the purely textual analysis favored by Justice 
Scalia with Justice Stevens’s more purposive and deferential 
approach, looking to Congress and the Executive to shine light on the 
statute’s scope and leave only Justice Kennedy dissatisfied. But in 
applying the EWSAA to pending cases, even Justice Kennedy is likely 
to concur that a jurisdiction-stripping provision, as in the EWSAA’s 
Section 1503, presumably applies retroactively without a clear 
statement to the contrary. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit’s holdings will 
probably be overturned, and the cases against Iraq ruled 
nonjusticiable. 
 
